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WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE NON-TRACK OPTICS: 
STREAMLINING THE PROCESS OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS 




Budget overruns and scheduling difficulties within the White Sands Missile Range 
(WSMR) test community have become more prevalent of late. Two of the biggest 
customer complaints have been that WSMR is too expensive, and that the scheduling 
process is slow and inflexible; the WSMR Non-track Optics organization has been 
suggested as the main contributor to these problems.  
WSMR Non-track Optics manages multiple types of specialized static cameras, 
networking instrumentation, and vehicles to transport and control its equipment, but has 
shown itself unable to support numerous test activities scheduled during the same 
timeframe. 
The focus of this thesis is to define the process whereby requirements for Non-
track Optics support are routed, identify process inefficiencies within the organization, 
and recommend solutions for the Non-track Optics organization to successfully adopt the 
“pull” method, where the ability to set-up instrumentation and support exactly what the 
customers want, when they need it, is achieved within budget. In identifying and 
addressing these inefficiencies, solutions can be applied resulting in WSMR becoming a 
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White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) is a test range that provides DoD agencies, 
foreign militaries, private industries, and academic fields with an extensive infrastructure 
and data collection capability for testing a multitude of developmental systems to further 
strengthen National Defense. WSMR is located in Southern New Mexico and is 
composed of over 2.2 million acres, which makes it attractive to customers requiring an 
abundance of land and airspace as shown in Figure 1 (U.S. Army White Sands Missile 
Range Customer Handbook, 2010, p. 6-9). WSMR population in 2010 was 1,651 with 
17% of the population being engineers. Most common industries in 2007 through 2011 
were public administration (27%), professional, scientific, and technical services (23%), 
manufacturing (13%), and transportation and warehousing (7%) (White Sands, New 
Mexico (NM 88002) profile: population, maps, real estate, averages, homes, statistics, 
relocation, travel, jobs, hospitals, schools, crime, moving, houses, news, n.d.). The highly 
diverse, natural environment with all terrain types are further augmented with an 
extensive array of threat-representative ground and airborne targets, as well as 
infrastructure targets, cave networks, deeply buried structures, and employment of 
realistic electro-magnetic and ECM environments. WSMR is also populated with over 
3,000 permanent data collection sites, extensive instrumentation equipment, and a data 
processing facility for real-time and deferred test data processing. As the largest open-air 
land test range in the DoD, WSMR consists of multiple instrumentation and data 
collection capabilities, such as timing signals, target support, telemetry, flight safety, 
hazardous explosive tests, calibration and standards, photography and film processing, 
trajectory, attitude and event measurements, communications throughout the range, 
recovery of components, report preparation, and data evaluation (U.S. Army Whites Sands 
Missile Range Capabilities Handbook, 2009).  
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Figure 1.  WSMR Land Space and Climate (from U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range 
Customer Handbook, 2010, p. 7)  
Within WSMR, there are two main organizations, U.S. Army Installation 
Management Command (IMCOM) and White Sands Test Center (WSTC), with different 
directorates which have distinct responsibilities when it comes to converting customer 
requirements to actual data collection as shown in Figure 2. WSTC is shown as the “Test 
Center Commander” in the center green box in Figure 2 and IMCOM is shown as 
“Garrison Commander” in the orange right box in Figure 2. The WSTC, which is the 
primary focus of this JAP, is responsible for overall planning and execution of test and 
evaluation missions. Three of the main WSMR directorates are the materiel test (MT), 




Figure 2.  WSMR Organizational Chart (from U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range 
Customer Handbook, 2010, p. 9) 
The MT Directorate is the testing arm of WSMR. MT’s organizational chart is 
provided in Figure 3. MT provides evaluation of Army systems, materiel and equipment 
through field and laboratory testing. MT is the organization that interfaces directly with 
the customer and characterizes the customers’ requirements into the operational 




Figure 3.  MT Directorate Organizational Chart  
The range operations (RO) directorate establishes and implements policies; 
manages the range schedule, programs, and procedures; and develops an acquisition for 
range instrumentation, range operations, data measurements, data reduction, and 
complete flight safety services. The RO directorate organizational chart is provided in 
Figure 4. RO receives the OR from MT and is responsible for managing and scheduling 
the range’s data collection assets. RO’s schedulers and MT’s test personnel meet on a 
weekly basis to formulate a range test schedule for a month in advance. It is the 
responsibility of the RO scheduler to ensure efficient range utilization, taking into 
consideration program and mission priorities, so that instrumentation support groups are 
employed to their maximum capacity. RO’s data collection branch must satisfy the 
requirements for data collection and data analysis, as defined within the OR. The RO data 
collection branch is composed of various instrumentation support groups, including 
optics, radar, and telemetry. The optics instrumentation array consists of Multimode 
Automatic Tracking Systems (MATS), versatile tracking mounts (VTM) and a version of 
the Contraves-developed Kineto tracking mount (KTM). The KTM collects video data of 
the tracked object’s image, azimuth and elevation angles. The Battle Space Real-Time 
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Video System collects video from elevated gimbals units on towers. The collected optics 
data also include attitude, event, and miss-distance information. Other optics applications 
include radiometry, laser detection and analysis, and low-cost sacrificial high-speed 
target interior imaging. The optical instrumentation array is complemented with the 
Distant Object Attitude Measurement System (DOAMS), Launch Area Theodolite 
Systems (LATS), mobile telescopes, fixed cameras (from here on referred to as Non-
track Optics), and closed circuit television.  
 
Figure 4.  RO Directorate Organizational Chart  
The information management (IM) directorate operates and maintains the WSMR 
real-time and post-test network hardware and software systems. The network is utilized 
by WSMR customers to distribute and collect test data at different locations throughout 
WSMR. The IM directorate organizational chart is provided in Figure 5. In addition, IM 
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provides the state-of-the-art, real-time processing and display of both range 
instrumentation and telemetry data for range customers, as well as post-test analysis.  
 
Figure 5.  IM Directorate Organizational Chart  
The above narration introduces the complexity of doing business at WSMR, 
illustrating the importance of all test team members working together for a well-
engineered business process. A test range should be able to adapt and execute in an 
efficient manner in order to receive customer satisfaction, with an acceptable cost in 
range operations. However, customer surveys, past experience, and mission cost data 
have repeatedly pointed out inconsistencies and discrepancies with the method on which 
WSMR currently conducts business. WSMR customers have often adjusted their overall 
project’s schedule, and conferred with the range, to investigate the availability of WSMR 
Non-track Optics resources during a requested time frame. Because of this, the Non-track 
Optics organization specifically, have been scrutinized for being inefficient and over the 
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allotted budget. The correct tools and a solid process for scheduling this type of support 
element do not seem to exist, and this has become evident when costs increase and the 
number of tests conducted at the range decline.  
Organizational behavior is defined as, “field of study that investigates the impact 
that individuals, groups, and structure have on behavior within organizations, for the 
purpose of applying such knowledge toward improving an organization’s effectiveness” 
(Essentials of organizational behavior, 2012, p. 2). This JAP will concentrate on 
conducting an organizational structure analysis specific to the Non-track Optics 
organization. After conducting a comprehensive study of the Non-track Optics 
organizational processes, an understanding of the specifics issues will be revealed. The 
findings could ultimately be utilized in a future development of a strategic plan 
specifically formulated to make the Non-track Optics organization more efficient.  
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
• To define the existing structure and process flow of WSMR’s Non-track 
Optics organization, from written customer request to the actual operator 
support in the field. 
• To collect valid data on Non-track Optics’ business process and structure. 
• To determine the specific areas in the Non-track Optics organization that 
have the greatest impact on mission cost and scheduling conflicts. 
• To make final recommendations on needed changes to WSMR’s Non-
track Optics organization that will reduce customer costs and improve 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The overall research questions to be addressed for this particular JAP are as 
follows: 
• What is the current Non-track Optics organization business process and 
how much does it cost? 
• Is the current Non-track Optics organization business process efficient? 
• What are the major problems associated with the current Non-track Optics 
organization business process? 
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• How are organizations or WSMR directorates affected by these problems? 
• What should be done to correct the major problems and how will these 
actions mitigate problems being experienced? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will focus on the Non-track Optics organization business process and 
its associated costs using three specific programs previously conducted at WSMR: Joint 
Air to Ground Missile (JAGM), Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), and 
patriot advanced capability 3 (PAC 3). Additionally, because this Joint Applied Project 
(JAP) focuses primarily on the program management and not on technical aspects, 
classified portions of these programs will not be included.  The systems described herein 
may be in a historical configuration which may have evolved to a different system at 
present day. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
In the past, “data calls” were initiated by WSMR management in an effort to gain 
a better understanding of the problems portrayed in this JAP. Our ensuing research will 
include the collection of existing data (i.e., customer post-mission surveys, cost reports, 
and existing policies of conducting business), with the anticipation of identifying and 
justifying any existing problems with the current Non-track Optics organization business 
process. Once evidence is found which confirms a business problem, the data will be 
processed through analytical models in order to identify where the issue truly exists. The 
types of Non-track Optics parameters that will be analyzed are as follows: 
• Time to develop support plans 
• Instrumentation set-up times 
• Personnel travel time between base locations to mission specific sites 
• Labor costs and time to support each mission task, to include immediate 
delivery of data products to the customer 
• Instrumentation tear-down times 
• Standard operating procedures 
• Mission logs detailing the procedures for interfacing with other WSMR 
support groups 
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• Schedule logs that revealed when mission schedules were changed due to 
Non-track Optics support 
After gathering sufficient data, an in-depth analysis will take place. The first 
objective will be to attach data and facts to the Non-track Optics organization efficiency. 
A detailed process map describing incoming customer requirements, range mission 
planning, execution, and reporting will be broken down in an effort to identify 
deficiencies that will be specific to the Non-tracks Optics organization. Next, a list of root 
causes will be attached to each deficiency. Data on the major root causes will be collected 
for conducting process and data analyses. Finally, after researching and analyzing all the 
data, conclusions emerged and solutions will be suggested.  
F. DEFINITIONS 
Concepts used in this JAP are based on acquisition management, strategic 
management, organizational structure analysis, and terminologies, which are portrayed in 
the following three programs: JAGM LM F2A, GMLRS UPVT-9, and PAC 3 vs. PAAT 
P7–4. These programs are analyzed within this JAP document. Army definitions, as well 
as acronyms, of acquisition and program terms are provided throughout this document, 
where needed. 
1. JAGM 
The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), shown in Figure 6, is a common air to-
ground precision guided missile for use by joint service manned and unmanned aircraft to 
destroy high-value stationary; moving and maneuvering; and relocate able land and naval 
targets.  JAGM is required to provide a common, multi-mode weapon capable of 
providing both current and future aviation platforms with reactive targeting capabilities 
satisfying the sum of needs across the joint platforms, and eliminate the requirement for 
separate upgrades to multiple existing missile systems.  The JAGM will replace the 





Figure 6.  Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) (from PEO Missiles and Space Weapons 
Systems Book, 2012, p. 65) 
The test support that WSMR provides includes optics (tracking and non-tracking), 
telemetry, radar, meteorology, range control, and communications support. The data 
products provided by WSMR personnel are provided in Table 1. 
 
JAGM Data Products 




telemetry data stream 
 




Non-track optical data 




TM raw data stream digital tapes 
 
decoded TM digital data 
Frequencies telemetry 
 
MMW radar operating frequency band 
 
MMW radar center frequency 
 
MMW radar frequency bandwidth 
 
MMW radar transmit power 
Table 1.   JAGM Data Products 
 11 
2. GMLRS  
The GMLRS unitary rocket is part of the MLRS family of munitions (MFOM). It 
is a product improvement in the family of guided rockets intended to accommodate 
different types of payloads. The baseline GMLRS Unitary rocket deploys a highly 
explosive warhead for point or delayed detonation modes of operation. It is a product 
improvement in the family of guided rockets intended to meet the system goal of 
integrating a filled explosive warhead into the GMLRS rocket. 
The GMLRS rocket pod (RP) is comprised of a rocket pod container (RPC) and 
GMLRS development flight test rockets, as shown in Figure 7. The RP is capable of 
holding six (6) GMLRS development flight test rockets, but for test purposes, it contains 
the number of GMLRS rockets required to support a particular mission. The GMLRS RP 
is loaded into either an M270A1 or a HIMARS launcher, from which the GMLRS 
rocket(s) is launched. 
 
Figure 7.  GMLRS Major Subsections (from Operations requirement No. 34323:  
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), 2011, p. 6) 
The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) unitary rocket (GMLRS 
Unitary) preflight testing and flight test missions associated with this particular test were 
conducted from an M270A1 or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) 
launcher. One, three and six rockets were ripple launched from an M270A1 (or 
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HIMARS) launcher positioned in a level attitude. After launch, the rocket flew an 
approximate 40-kilometer guided profile from launch site to impact site, where the 
payload event occurred. The test support that WSMR provided included optics (tracking 
and non-tracking), telemetry, radar, meteorology, range control, and communications 
support. The data products provided by WSMR personnel are provided in Table 2. 
 
GMLRS Data Products 
 Raw Data Radar Tapes 
  Telemetry Tapes 
  Non-Track Optical Data/Fixed Camera Film 
 In-Test Data Trajectory Plots 
  Trajectory Tapes 
  Telemetry Plots 
  Telemetry Tapes 
 Post-Test Data Trajectory 
  Miss Distance 
  Telemetry 
  Events or Time 
  Geodetic Survey Computation 
 Frequencies Telemetry 
  Proximity Sensor 
 Documentary and 
Aerial Photography Stills 
  Motion Picture 
 Recovery Location 
  Hardware 
 Recovery Aid Radar Look Angles to Impact Point 
  Radar Range to Impact Point 
  Non-Track Optical Look Angles to Impact Point 
  Telemetry Look Angle At Loss of Signal 
 Other Items Test Results of Rocket Assembly and Checkout 
Table 2.   GMLRS Data Products  
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3. PAC-3  
The PAC-3 missiles are small, robust, agile interceptors with an operating 
envelope compatible with the tactical missile threats as shown in Figure 8. SDI-
developed technologies were utilized in the design of these small, lightweight, agile 
missiles, with performance and capability sized for Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM), 
Maneuvering Tactical Missiles (MTM) and Air-Breathing Threats (ABT). The missiles 
are sized for transportability and provide a large launcher load-out capability. It achieves 
its target kill by direct body-to-warhead impact. They are hit-to-kill (HTK) missiles. 
Each missile performs fly-out using inertial guidance, homing in on the target via 
onboard radar and a guidance and control system, for an HTK intercept. Range safety 
requirements dictate the incorporation of a Flight Termination System (FTS) for each 
missile. The FTS command receiver each used one unique 3-tone command destruct 
sequence.  
 
Figure 8.  PAC-3 Missile Major Subsections (from Operations requirements No. 08920:  
Patriot, 2011, p. 3) 
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The Patriot guided missile has four clipped-deltas with an all-movable tail 
propellant rocket motor. The missile is 531.52 cm (209.26 in.) in length, with a body 
diameter of 40.82 cm (16.07 in.) and a total fin span of 86.87 cm (34.20 in). The missile 
is rust-red color with two white cable conduits running the length of the missile at 180 
degrees apart. 
The radome assembly consists of a ceramic shell with slip-cast fused silica, a 
metal tip, and a glass-reinforced plastic base ring. The radome forms the major portion of 
an aerodynamic nose shape and serves as an RF window for the guidance seeker. 
The Patriot missile warhead section contains a live warhead with a safety and 
arming device (S&A) mounted to its base plate. The S&A, designated M143, provides 
safety by inhibiting detonation of the warhead until the missile is a safe distance from the 
launcher. 
The warhead firing circuit can be activated by signals from the fuse, by a 
command destruct signal from the modular digital airborne guidance section (MDAGS), 
or by a self-destruct circuit. The self-destruct circuit can activate the S&A if there is a 
loss of on-board missile power, loss of a series of uplink messages, or specific 
malfunction in the missile. Command destruct from the MDAGS results from an uplink 
message sent by the radar. 
WSMR provides the following test support: optics (tracking and non-tracking), 
telemetry, radar, meteorology, range control, and communications. The data products 









PAC 3 Data Products 
 Raw Data Radar Tapes (Missile, Aircraft, Target) 
  Telemetry Tapes 
  Cinetheodolite Media 
  Telescope Media 
  Non-Track Optical Data/Fixed Camera Media 
In-Test Data Trajectory Plots 
  Trajectory Tapes 
  Telemetry Plots 
  Telemetry Tapes 
 Post-Test Data Trajectory (Missile, Aircraft, Target) 
  Miss Distance 
  Telemetry 
  Events or Time 
  Geodetic Survey Computation 
Frequencies Telemetry (Missile) 
  Radar, Fuze, Downlink (Missile) 
 Documentary and 
Aerial Photography Stills 
  Motion Picture 
 Recovery Location 
  Hardware 
 Recovery Aid Radar Look Angles to Impact Point 
  Radar Range to Impact Point 
  Non-Track Optical Look Angles to Impact Point 
  Telemetry Look Angle At Loss of Signal 
 Other Items Test Results of Rocket Assembly and Checkout 






The organization of this thesis includes an Introduction (Chapter I), Historical 
Mission’s Business and Cost Impact (Chapter II), Current WSMR Business Process 
(Chapter III), Permanent Infrastructure (Chapter IV), Network Equipment (Chapter V), 










II. HISTORICAL MISSION’S BUSINESS AND COST IMPACT 
In this chapter, the WSMR customer’s voice will be portrayed. Data will be 
gathered on previously completed missions to find out if customers are completely 
satisfied with the service and products they are currently receiving from WSMR or if 
there is an existing problem with the way WSMR currently conducts business. No human 
subject research will be conducted but an analysis of existing data will be conducted.  
A. CUSTOMER SURVEYS 
Customers are encouraged to provide feedback after executing a mission via a 
survey. The surveys, which cover a variety of subjects (e.g., cost, scheduling, and mission 
execution) are submitted directly from the customers to the WSMR Business 
Development Office (BDO). The WSMR BDO works directly under the WSMR 
Commander shown as the “Commander” in the center gray box in Figure 2. The WSMR 
BDO’s mission objective is to provide command level planning, business development, 
sustainability, marketing, strategic planning, and plans/operations tracking and 
coordination with team WSMR organizations. This survey communicates the positive 
and negative lessons that were learned, from the initial planning, conducting, and post-
mission reporting of each scheduled event. Once customer surveys are received, the 
WSMR BDO office they are analyzed and distributed to the WSMR management team in 
the various directorates to make all of the organizational stakeholders aware of the issues, 
generate lessons learned, and recommend solutions for future events.  
The WSTC customer survey form was formulated to enhance the customer survey 
high level metrics and address specific WSMR requirements. The customer survey’s goal 
is to improve WSMR customer services by establishing a straight-forward method for the 
customers to provide feedback concerning WSMR services and to task WSMR 
organizations to respond to customer criticisms with any needed improvements. WSMR 
BDO uses a customer survey automated tool website that is created and provided by 
WSMR’s headquarters, the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), to send, 
receive, store, and report customer surveys. The customer survey is composed of five 
 18 
main sections; test planning, test execution, test reports, cost estimate, and customer 
service. These five main sections require the customer to directly rate the service 
provided by WSMR support as one of the following: exceeded, met, or needs 
improvement. If one of the sections is marked as “needs improvement,” then the 
customer is requested to mark one or more of the specific areas needing improvement.  
The specific choices to select are listed in the needs improvement columns in Table 4.  
 
Sample of Five Main Sections within Customer Survey 
Test Planning Test Execution Test Reports Cost Estimate 
Customer 
Service 
Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded 














and Setup •Timeliness •Estimate 
•Communication/ 
Responsiveness 
























issues •Other—Specify •Other—Specify   
  •Infrastructure       
  •Other—Specify       
Table 4.   Sample of Five Main Sections within Customer Survey  
A total of 212 surveys were sent between FY10 and FY12 (FY10–80 surveys, 
FY11–63 surveys, and FY12–69surveys) to the various customers, with an average 
response rate of 52%. As shown in Figure 9, between FY10 and FY12 data showed that 
an average of 60% exceeded test planning, 78% exceeded test execution, 40% exceeded 
test reporting, 25% exceeded cost expectation, and 79% exceeded customer service. As 
shown in Figure 10, between FY10 and FY12 data showed that the an average of 34% 
met test planning, 16% met test execution, 54% met test reporting, 64% met cost 
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expectation, and 18% met customer service. As shown in Figure 11, between FY10 and 
FY12 data showed that an average of 4% needed improvement in test planning, 4% 
needed improvement in test execution, less than 1% needed improvement in test 
reporting, 6% needed improvement in cost expectation, and 2% needed improvement in 
customer service. The results described above showed that between FY10 and FY12 
there were 29 out of 112 customer surveys with negative feedback on test planning and 
24 out of 112 customer surveys with negative feedback on cost expectation. These results 
for the first five main sections of customer surveys between FY 10 and FY 12 timeframe 
pointed towards two main areas of concern: test planning (which accounted for test 
scheduling) and cost expectation.  
 




Figure 10.  Customer Survey Met Ratings for FY10 through FY12 
 
 
Figure 11.  Customer Survey Need Improvement Ratings for FY10 through FY12 
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The customer survey also consists of five additional specific questions that 
require customers to answer with a direct yes or no type answer. Also, these questions 
provide space for customers to provide specific comments as to why they choose to mark 
their answer as yes or no. The five specific questions included in the customer survey are 
as follows: 
• Overall were you satisfied with the test scheduling process? 
• Was your test scheduled within a week of your requested timeframe? 
• Were all of your instrumentation requirements met? 
• Was your test data provided in time to meet critical milestones? 
• Would you use our services again? 
The pie charts in Figures 12, 13, and 14 show the feedback from customers from 
just the first two questions provided above. According to these charts, many customers 
have consistently been unsatisfied with the scheduling of their missions. On average, 
between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2012, about 7% of the surveys reported 
dissatisfaction with the test scheduling process and about 8% of the surveys reported that 
their test was not scheduled within a week of their requested time frame. WSMR has 
already begun working on correcting these problems.  
 
Figure 12.  WSTC Customer Survey Specific Questions—FY10 
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Figure 13.  WSTC Customer Survey Specific Questions—FY11 
 
Figure 14.  WSTC Customer Survey Specific Questions—FY12 
WSMR’s ultimate goal is to become the benchmark for quality, cost-control, 
transparency, delivery, and breadth of services by providing the most efficient, 
convenient, timely, and accurate range testing for its customers (Strategic Plan, 2012). 
To accomplish this goal, energy was focused on solving these existing negative issues 
that were brought to light by the surveys, to include understanding which area of the 
overall process is responsible for increasing the cost and preventing projects from 
meeting critically scheduled milestones. 
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B. COST BREAKDOWN ANALYSIS 
As stated earlier, this research focused on three programs in order to conduct an 
actual cost breakdown analysis: JAGM, GMLRS and PAC-3. WSMR projects are 
normally broken down into a series of different test phases. Not all programs go through 
the same test phases; it all depends on the objectives that each project is required to meet. 
Sometimes, testing is limited by availability of funds for each project and how much 
testing they can afford. Some of the most common test phases, or tasks, are planning 
support, pre-test activities, captive flight tests (CFT), hot missions, firing readiness tests 
(FRC), ground checks (G/Cs), pad integration, tearing down of equipment setup, data 
reduction, and post-test support.  
In order to find out which test phase might have been the most costly for a 
particular project, data was collected on each of the three missions. As shown in Figures 
15, 16, and 17, the different test phases for each mission were individualized with their 
costs. Comparisons were made on each project’s test phase to disclose estimated costs vs. 
actual costs. Data revealed that the actual cost to support certain test phases greatly 
exceeded the cost estimates. For example, as shown in Table 5, the JAGM mission had an 
overall cost increase of 32% between the estimated cost and the actual cost, with the 
biggest increase of 389% occurring during the pad integration phase. Table 6 shows that 
the GMLRS mission had a cost increase of 16% for the actual flight test itself and 11% 
for the pre-test activities. Table 7 shows that the PAC-3 mission had an increase of 6% 
between estimated and actual cost, but its greatest impact of cost increase was reflected 
on the mission’s ground checks, which had an increase of 33% between the estimated 
cost and actual cost. The data provided in Figures 15, 16, and 17 clearly identify the 
problems with projects exceeding cost during certain test phases, particularly during the 
planning phases. This data is consistent with the data from the customer surveys which 
reports negative feedback on the inability to meet estimated project costs and schedule. In 
order to further isolate the costs associated with each of these missions, the next section 
concentrated on researching and finding out the different costs associated with each of 
the test phases and the type of personnel providing this support. Each of the test phases is 
supported by different organizational groups within the WSMR test team. They include a 
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mixture of contractors and civilians, as well as subject matter experts, who specialize in a 
variety of technical fields. These personnel assist in the areas of non-track optics, radar, 
and telemetry. In order to find out which particular personnel group is responsible for 
increasing the cost while performing a particular test phase, cost breakdowns and 
analyses were conducted for each of the three missions and for each of the more costly 
test phases, which in each instance was discovered to be the planning phase. 
JAGM Estimated Cost vs. Actual Cost 
Row Labels Estimated Cost Total Actual Cost 
Operation B (CFT and HOT Mission) $304,476 $355,458 
Operation XA-1 (Pad Integration) $7,270 $64,649 
Post Test Support $17,908 $15,582 
Grand Total $329,654 $435,690 
Table 5.   JAGM Estimated Cost vs. Actual Cost 
GMLRS Estimated Cost vs. Actual Cost 
Row Labels Estimated Cost Actual Cost 
Planning $27,603 $4,616 
Pre-Test Activities $128,233 $142,336 
FRC $49,182 $50,785 
Flight Test $137,936 $159,361 
Tear Down, Impact Area Activities, Data 
Reduction $135,056 $71,371 
Grand Total $478,010 $428,469 
Table 6.   GMLRS Estimated Cost vs. Actual Cost 
PAC-3 Estimated Cost vs. Actual Cost 
Row Labels  Estimated Cost  Actual Cost 
P7–4 FRC  
  (combined with P7–3) $150,467                                        $146,676 
P7–4 G/Cs $24,863                                          $54,105 
P7–4 Hot $217,205 $251,960 
P7–4 OR Processing $28,300 $12,999 
P7–4 Post Mission $63,723 $1,471 
P7–4 Pre-Mission $186,090 $248,252 
P7–4 Test Doc Preparation $2,380 $0 
Grand Total $673,028 $715,463 
Table 7.   PAC-3 Estimated vs. Actual Cost 
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Figure 15.  JAGM LM F2A Cost Breakdown 
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Figure 16.  GMLRS UPVT-9 Cost Breakdown 
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Figure 17.  PAC-3 vs. PAAT P7–4 Cost Breakdown 
1. JAGM Mission Cost Report 
As detailed in Figure 15 in the previous section, the JAGM mission consisted of 
primarily CFT and hot missions, pad integration, and post-test support test phases. The 
support for these particular test phases was provided by RO, which consisted mainly of 
optics branch, IM real-time branch, MT manned tactical branch and MT warhead branch. 
All of these support groups worked as a team to execute these test phases. Table 8 
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provides a breakdown of the mission cost for each of the test phases and these specific 
support groups. During the CFT and hot mission test phase, the RO optics branch cost 
came out to $109,115, which was 65.7% of its overall cost of $166,036 for this specific 
test phase.  
 
JAGM Breakdown Cost per Support Group and Test Phase 
Row Labels Overall Total Cost 
Operation B (CFT and HOT Mission)  $ 166,036  
IM Data Management Branch  $ 4,111  
MT Warhead Test Branch  $ 1,062  
RO Optics Branch  $ 109,115  
RO Radar Branch  $ 15,184  
RO Telemetry Branch  $ 36,564  
Operation XA-1 (Pad Integration)  $ 18,249  
MT Warhead Test Branch  $ 2,126 
RO Optics Branch  $ 4,778 
RO Telemetry Branch  $ 11,345 
Post Test Support  $ 15,582  
IM Data Management Branch  $ 15,582  
 
Table 8.   JAGM Breakdown Cost Per Support Group and Test Phase 
The overall cost to support the JAGM mission, per each support group, is 
provided in Figure 18. The range operations (RO) optics branch was by far the most 
expensive support group with an overall cost of approximately $113,893 (i.e., $109,115 + 
$4,778). This cost amounts to approximately 26% of the overall JAGM cost of $435,690 




Figure 18.  JAGM Total Cost by Support Group 
2. GMLRS Mission Cost Report 
The GMLRS mission consisted of a planning phase, pre-test activities, FRC, 
flight test, and tear-down & data reduction phases. Some of the main WSMR support 
groups that assisted with this mission were the RO optics branch, RO telemetry branch, 
MT warhead test branch, RO data reduction branch and MT manned tactical branch.  
Again, all of these support groups worked together as a team to execute each of 
the test phases. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the mission cost for each of the main 
test phases and the specific support group. The RO optics branch came out with the 
highest cost after supporting the following test phases: pre-test activities at $35,452 (56% 
of the total cost); flight test at $48,600 (46% of the total cost); and planning phase at 
$1.029 (64.72% of the total cost). As previously seen from the JAGM cost breakdown, 
the RO optics branch came out once again as the most costly support branch overall at 
$89,513 (i.e., $35,452 + $4,432 + 48,600 + $1,029) for the GMLRS mission, as shown in 
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the cost breakdown per support group in Figure 19. This cost amounts to approximately 
21% of the overall GMLRS cost of $428,469 (overall JAGM cost breakdown provided in 
Table 6). 
 
GMLRS Breakdown Cost per Support Group and Test Phase 
Row Labels Overall Total Cost 
Tear Down, Impact Area Activities, Data Reduction  $ 24,350  
MT Warhead Test Branch  $ 8,934  
RO Data Reduction Branch  $ 15,416  
RO Optics Branch  $— 
RO Telemetry Branch  $— 
Pre-Test Activities  $ 63,365  
MT Warhead Test Branch  $ 23,450  
RO Data Reduction Branch  $ 297  
RO Optics Branch  $ 35,452  
RO Radar Branch  $ 3,444  
RO Telemetry Branch  $ 722  
FRC  $ 27,849  
MT Warhead Test Branch  $— 
RO Data Reduction Branch  $ 4,266  
RO Optics Branch  $ 4,432  
RO Radar Branch  $ 1,081  
RO Telemetry Branch  $ 18,070  
Flight Test  $ 105,121  
MT Warhead Test Branch  $ 2,853  
RO Data Reduction Branch  $ 26,662  
RO Optics Branch  $ 48,600  
RO Radar Branch  $ 9,619  
RO Telemetry Branch  $ 17,387  
Planning  $ 1,590  
MT Warhead Test Branch  $— 
RO Optics Branch  $ 1,029  
RO Telemetry Branch  $ 560  




Figure 19.  GMLRS Total Cost by Support Group  
3. PAC 3 Mission Cost Report 
The PAC-3 mission consisted of an FRC, ground checks, hot mission, OR 
processing, pre-mission and post-mission test phases. Some of the main WSMR support 
groups that assisted with this mission were RO optics branch, roadblocks (e.g., security 
guard support), RO telemetry branch, IM transmission branch, and RO radar branch. 
Again, all of these support groups worked together as a team to execute each of the test 
phases. Table 10 provides a breakdown of the mission cost for each test phase and the 
specific support groups mentioned above. The RO optics branch came out with the 
highest cost after supporting the following test phases: FRC at $39,490 (41% of the total 
cost); ground checks at $32,100 (99% of the total cost); hot mission at $61,759 (48% of 
the total cost); OR processing at $6,574 (79% of the total cost); and pre-mission at 
$84,140 (88% of the total cost).  
Once again, on this third mission, the RO optics branch came out as the most 
costly support branch overall at $224,064 (i.e., $39,490 + $32,100 + 61,759 + $6,574 + 
$84,140), as shown in the cost breakdown per support group in Figure 20. This cost 
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amounts to approximately 31.3% of the overall PAC-3 cost of $715,462 (overall PAC-3 
cost breakdown provided in Table 7). 
 
PAC-3 Breakdown Cost per Support Group & Test Phase 
Row Labels Overall Total Cost 
P7–4 FRC (combined with P7–3) $95,353 
RO Data Reduction Branch $11,040 
RO Optics Branch $39,490 
RO Radar Branch $18,068 
RO Telemetry Branch $26,754 
 
P7–4 G/Cs $32,303 
RO Data Reduction Branch $66 
RO Optics Branch $32,100 
RO Telemetry Branch $137 
 
P7–4 Hot $128,530 
RO Data Reduction Branch $25,487 
RO Optics Branch $61,759 
RO Radar Branch $15,513 
RO Telemetry Branch $25,770 
 
P7–4 OR Processing $8,325 
RO Data Reduction Branch $847 
RO Optics Branch $6,574 
RO Radar Branch $904 
 
P7–4 Post Mission $281 
RO Data Reduction Branch $0 
RO Radar Branch $281 
RO Telemetry Branch $0 
 
P7–4 Pre-Mission $95,375 
RO Data Reduction Branch $1,008 
RO Optics Branch $84,140 
RO Radar Branch $7,671 
RO Telemetry Branch $2,557 
 
P7–4 Test Doc Preparation $0 
RO Telemetry Branch $0 
    
 
Table 10.   PAC-3 Breakdown Cost Per Support Group & Test Phase 
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Figure 20.  PAC-3 Total Cost by Support Group  
C. MISSIONS BUSINESS AND COST IMPACT SUMMARY 
Through customer surveys, it was speculated that there were existing issues at 
WSMR while providing test support. These main issues included poor performance on 
test planning (which account for test scheduling) and meeting customers cost 
expectations. The cost data collected for these three projects, JAGM, GMLRS, and PAC-
3, later revealed and consistently demonstrated affirmatively that missions were greatly 
exceeding cost. This was done by directly comparing the estimated vs. actual costs for 
each of the three missions. This research then took these findings a step further to find 
out which specific test phases and support groups in the overall mission were responsible 
for the higher-than-normal cost. Each mission cost was broken down into test phases and 
personnel support groups to clearly identify the responsible parties driving the cost up. 
RO optics branch was clearly identified as the most costly, by far, for each of these three 
missions. In the next chapter, we will be taking a step back to completely define the 
WSMR business process, to include customers’ submission of requirements, and 
WSMR’s planning and executing a mission, and final reporting. This will allow us to 
identify possible root causes impacting missions schedule and cost and further analyze 
the data to recommend the best solutions to better support the customers. 
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III. CURRENT WSMR BUSINESS PROCESS 
A. HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS PROCESS 
The group clearly defined and documented the White Sands Test Center (WSTC) 
business process utilized to conducted business, to include the planning, coordination, 
execution, and reporting. The group then subsequently described in detail the method and 
structure used specifically by the Non-track Optics group for executing a mission. 
Organizational process structure refers to the division of labor as well as the patterns of 
coordination, communication, workflow, and formal power that direct coordination 
(Organizational Behavior, 2012, p. 234). The perceived issue with the Non-track Optics 
group is that their precise method of operation is not clearly defined or properly 
documented, which leads to confusion and inefficiency. Understanding how their process 
works is essential to ensuring the competitiveness of the organization (Operations and 
supply chain management, 2011, p. 112). WSMR’s method of operation is a multistage 
process with multiple activities that are linked through flows. The group will determine 
the high level range requirements and the specific Non-track Optics flow charts. 
New customers will contact the WSMR Business Development Office (BDO) 
when they are initially interested in testing. The BDO is the initial point-of-contact (POC) 
when researching options for any testing needs. The BDO will review the scope of work 
or requirements documents prepared by the customer and respond with a WSMR support 
proposal package and rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate, based on the customer 
requirements. Once the proposal package and estimate meet the customer’s satisfaction, 
BDO interfaces with the Project Review and Assignment Team (PRAT), which in turn, 
reviews the proposal and assigns a range sponsor organization. Approved range sponsor 
organizations are the Materiel Test Directorate (MT), the WSMR Air Force detachment, 
and the WSMR Navy detachment. Sponsor organizations are authorized by the 
Commanding General and committed to fulfilling program requirements. Figure 21 
contains the initial process flow chart depicting a new customer coming to the range 




Figure 21.  Initial Process Flow Chart 
The sponsor organization has overall responsibility for coordinating test support 
activities necessary in planning and executing a test program. The sponsor organization 
then assigns a test officer (TO) to serve as the overall program manager for test support 
activities and is the customer’s single point of contact. The TO is responsible for leading 
and managing a test team composed of engineering support, technical support, analytical 
support, mission operations, human factors engineering, safety, security, environmental, 
and logistical support. The TO works with the accounting and financial management 
analysts and the contract office representatives to manage and control program funds. 
The TO also provides, to the customer, information regarding WSMR capabilities, 
policies, and procedures.  
Since all requirements are submitted to the range through the sponsor, the sponsor 
will confirm all customer support requirements and act on behalf of the customer to 
obtain WSMR services and in dealing with WSMR organizations. The TO represents the 
customer at the range scheduling meetings and also places job orders directly with 
various WSMR organizations to obtain mission support. The TO and customer will work 
together to create the operational requirements (OR) document, which is a detailed 
statement on the requirements for one, or more, specific mission operation. The OR 
provides a means for customers to submit their requirements to the range and ensures the 
range meets those requirements. Test planning and execution will be performed using the 
OR. These requirements from the customer, are coordinated with the range operations 
directorate (RO) range engineer through the TO. The range engineer (RE) coordinates 
range instrumentation and support based on detailed information provided in the OR. The 
RE assists the TO in all aspects of services that involve assets from RO and information 
management (IM) directorate. IM is commonly referred to as “commo.” The IM 

















fiber network. This includes coordination of early planning, all levels of documentation, 
data collection, validation of support plans, scheduling, and post-test data processing.  
The range support organizations each develop a detailed support plan for each 
service request in the OR. The range support element then submits the support plan and 
cost estimate back to the RE in response to the requirements in the OR. Once the OR is 
approved and the test is on the range schedule, the test may then be conducted.  
Figure 22 depicts the complete High Level Requirements Process map: 
 
Figure 22.  High Level Requirements Process map 
B. SPECIFIC NON-TRACK OPTICS PLANNING PROCESS 
The current Non-track Optics process can be summed up into four major 
processes: planning, scheduling, changes, and execution. The four processes come 
together to create the Non-track Optics organization. Planning begins when the TO 
generates an OR document for a specific test and submits it for review to the assigned 
RE. Once the RE is satisfied with the OR, it is accepted by the range and sent forth to the 
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specific planners, in this case the optics planners. Optics planners process the OR and 
send specific non-track optics requirements to the Non-track Optics technicians. The 
Non-track Optics planners begin formulating instrumentation plans to meet the 
customers’ requirements. The optics planners then generate support plans, uploads them 
into the optics database, and create an optics commo matrix to make sure commo 
supports their requirements. Non-track optics schedules are generated by the designated 
schedulers via optics support plans. The optics support plan details how the field 
technicians will support and execute each specific operation in the OR. 
The scheduling process begins when the TO enters the customer’s general 
requirements into the long range scheduling tool, called Test Resource Management 
System (TRMS). TRMS allows the TO to enter the basic test requirements, date, and 
timeline information. The “T-X” refers to the amount test-days that remain before test 
execution. For example, at T-60 days, the range de-conflict the forecast and “locks in” 
the daily test schedule for all hot missions. The range achieves this by conducting weekly 
scheduling meetings every Thursday to officially schedule missions out to four weeks. At 
T-7, final coding occurs; with concurrence from the optics scheduler, a range mission 
code is assigned to each test. 
Customers are allowed to make last minute changes to their optics requirements 
through a “change request.” This change request may come from the project through the 
TO, who may make the request via TRMS, or if on-site, by phone or e-mail. The field 
personnel may also contact the range engineer or optics planner with a change request. 
Once the optics planner is notified, he may accept the required changes or issue a data 
science limitation (DSL), which indicates the range will not be able to meet the 
customers’ full requirements. The project may accept the DSL and proceed to execute the 
mission or the project can cancel if the DSL is going to adversely impact the mission. If 
the optics planner accepts the changes, he must modify the optics support plans and 
confirm the changes with the optics scheduler in order to execute the required changes.  
Execution, which is the final step, occurs when the optics group sets up its 
instrumentation equipment in the field and collects video data during the hot mission. At 
the completion of the mission, the raw data is gathered and sent to data reduction group 
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where it is analyzed and returned to the customer with the final data product. The 
complete Non-track Optics process can be summed up in the process chart in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.  Current Non-Track Optics Process 
 40 
C. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
WSMR Non-track Optics is currently unable to efficiently support customer 
requirements based on the costumer exit surveys. The support from Non-track Optics has 
transitioned from simpler, non-mobile, and film-based equipment at pre-established sites 
to a versatile, mobile, and digital system. The trade-off with this transition is that the 
newer systems require specialized skills, physically demanding labor, and time 
consuming set-up and tear-down procedures. Due to the complexity and extensive 
amount of time that it takes to set-up and tear-down these mobile systems, WSMR Non-
track Optics is consistently exceeding their mission support cost estimates. Additionally, 
as a result of the significant amount of time to set-up and tear-down the Non-track Optics 
equipment, WSMR’s scheduling office has a difficult time in scheduling mission support 
for other programs due to non-availability of equipment and manpower.  
It was apparent from listening to the voice of our customers and from the post-test 
exit assessments that the Non-track Optics group was not measuring up to customer 
satisfaction in two main areas: cost and scheduling. The JAP members investigated and 
determined the critical root causes of the unsatisfactory support by communicating with 
the Non-track Optics subject matter experts (SME), reviewing post-tests after-action 
items, reading the lessons-learned reports, and reviewing optics data logs and 
troubleshooting calls. These negative issues were caused by numerous factors. A list of 
30 root causes was compiled, to include:  
• Network equipment failures: malfunctions within commo network 
equipment that supports optics test beds. 
• Lack of permanent infrastructure: increases setup and complexity of the 
optics plan 
• Computer interface security requirements: additional restraints levied on 
the field technicians to uphold information assurance directives. 
• Lack of personnel: inefficient number of technicians to support numerous 
tests. 
• Schedule changes: changes to the range schedule cause delays in setup, 
teardown, and turnaround time 
• Lack of adequate advanced requirements: last minute changes to optics 
setup plan 
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• Lack of cameras: insufficient amount of equipment 
• Travel time to sites: duration of time to travel to and from the test site and 
main post 
• Lack of accurate info: insufficient coordination regarding range 
roadblocks and coordination with other range elements, such as 
communications, fuel, and generator groups 
• Conflicting requirements: scheduling conflicts occur when setup for one 
test is scheduled while another program has scheduled hot mission support 
• Enclosures/mounting hardware: need to manufacture specialized fixtures 
and camera enclosures for each test setup in order to protect cameras 
during impact  
• Lack of redundancy: if the system or equipment go down, there is no 
backup plan 
• Increasing data download times: digital equipment collects large quantities 
of data requiring increased time to download 
The JAP team then created a cause and effect study, by ranking the issues from 
most important to least important, taking into consideration how negatively the causes 
impacted the missions, how frequently the issues occurred, and how easily the issues 
could be addressed. The causes were given a score 1–10, with the highest score of 10 
being the most critical cause and the lowest score of 1 representing a less significant 
cause and impact. The cumulative score for each cause was then used to rank the issues. 
The results of this investigation are provided in Figure 24. The results verified main 
issues needing to be addressed by the Non-track Optics group: lack of manpower and 
camera equipment, network support equipment failures, and the lack of permanent 
infrastructure. The resulting issues to address are lack of manpower and camera 
equipment. These issues could be easily remedied by hiring additional personnel and 
buying supplementary camera equipment. However, due to the government’s restrictions 
on hiring and the greatly reduced funding, this JAP has determined the only available 




Figure 24.  Root Cause Voting from Cause and Effect Study 
Network support equipment failures lead to delays and increased troubleshooting 
time, costing the customer additional funds. Traditional network support equipment 
includes tactical local area network encryption (TACLANES), test support network 
(TSN) stacks, and microwaves. This equipment is used out in the field to collect and 
transport optics data during the live fire missions. TACLANES are communication 
security devices used to encrypt signals during transport of data. The TSN stacks are 
comprised of routers, switches, and fiber to ethernet converters that are used to access the 
WSMR test support network internet protocol (TSN-IP). The TSN-IP is a digital fiber 
optic network that supports transmission of analog and digital data throughout the range. 
Microwaves are used to transport video data via RF from the test beds out to a 
communication hub where it can then be placed onto the WSMR TSN-IP. 
The lack of permanent infrastructure on the range means that the field technicians 
have an increased setup time due to the extra labor required preparing for each test. 
Lacking permanent infrastructure (i.e., underground cables, fixed pedestals, permanent 
TSN nodes and encryptors) increases the technician’s workload, stress, fatigue, and 
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inability to support additional tests. If additional test sites were to contain permanent 
infrastructure resources, the field technicians would have reduced setup time, 
straightforward configurations, and a much greater likelihood of trouble-free missions. 
This would give the Non-track Optics group the capability to support additional 
customers throughout the year at a lower cost. 
In the next chapter, the JAP members will further examine the methodology used 
in dealing with the network equipment failures and analyze how the failures affect the 
range missions and the customers. The JAP will also evaluate and define the issues 
associated with the lack of permanent infrastructure and then determine ways to mitigate 
these issues under the current test environment. If these two major concerns can be 
addressed, the Non-track Optics group could become more efficient and effective, and 
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IV. PERMANENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The lack of permanent infrastructure was identified as one of the key Non-track 
Optics issues. By infrastructure, we are referring to the basic equipment and structures 
that are needed for WSMR Non-track Optics to execute a mission. Currently, a non–
permanent Non-track Optics basic set-up may require the following: trenching and 
placing field wire and fiber optic cable for control and communication with cameras, 
placing tripods according to specific requirements, construction of towers, installing 
target poles in alignment with camera angles, coordinating geodetic surveys (cameras and 
target poles), placing cameras on tripods, aligning microwaves for video distribution, and 
camera adjustments. Additionally, after conclusion of the mission, everything is removed 
and field wire is discarded.  
As illustrated in the Fishbone Diagram, Non-track Optics site set-up in Figure 25, 
the Non-optic track site setup has four primary contributors to the labor issue which are 
as follows: lack of infrastructure, lack of equipment, improved communication (multiple 
organization required), and changing requirements.  
The identified problem is that lack of infrastructure leads to increases in labor 
which in turn directly increases the cost. With this in mind, the JAP members used root 
cause analysis of permanent infrastructure to further quantify the need for permanent 
infrastructure, as well as explore the potential challenges and drawbacks associated with 
its implementation. First, we examined Non-track support processes and looked for ways 
to decrease costs, scheduling impacts. The most time consuming mission elements were 
then determined. Next, which mission element parts could be improved, as well as, the 
estimated cost and time savings to implement change was determined. 
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Figure 25.  Fishbone Diagram Non-Track Optics Site Set-up  
B. ANALYSIS 
There are several non-track operations that contribute to the total time required to 
complete a mission. The complete mission set is comprised of set-up time, dress rehearsal 
before the day of testing, day of test, and the teardown after testing. A complete mission 
profile analysis is needed, to be able to identify which elements of the mission 
components are contributing most to the overall mission time. The JAP members used 
testing mission logs from the JAGM and GMLRS that provided the totals for setup hours, 
dress rehearsal hours, day of test hours, and teardown hours. Additionally we acquired 
the total sum of all of these non-track camera mission operation areas for non-fixed 
missions to calculate the total percentage of time for each mission elements. The total 
sums and percentages of non-track camera operations based on the JAGM and GMLRS 




Table 11.   Mission Profile Analysis for Non-Track Camera Operations (based on two 
recent representative missions for JAGM and GMLRS)  
These results outline the greatest percentage of time being spent on the setup 
component for the complete mission profile for both mission examples, which means that 
this was the key factor for reducing time for the complete mission set. These results, in 
examining the infrastructure as it relates to time and its impacts, translate directly into 
cost savings.  
After it had been identified that the set-up is the key contributor for labor excesses 
within the complete mission set, the JAP members broke down the set-up mission 
component in to sub-components needed to complete the entire setup of a mission set. 
Using a variety of WSMR testing mission logs, the JAP members were able to construct a 
mission process road map that approximates the average time to execute a setup based on 
the approximate times to execute the sub components of the setup. Within the mission 
setup process map, we were also able to identify those components within the setup that 
could or could not be removed and those that could be reduced if we use a fixed site. (See 
Figure 26—optics non-track mission setup process map). 
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Figure 26.  Optics Non-Track Mission Setup Process Map  
As illustrated in Figure 26, the total approximate setup time would be 298 hours 
and by removing the setup functions highlighted above in red, that do not apply to a fixed 
site that can be reduced down to approximately 211 hours. Although those elements in 
yellow would reduce in quantity, currently there is not data available to quantify exactly 
what that amount would be. However, we can report that by utilizing fixed sites with 
permanent infrastructure the range can greatly reduce setup times. The total approximate 
range would be reduced from 298 to between 211 and 189 hours. At an approximate 
labor rate for contract support of $80.85 per man hours, just for the setup component 
alone, would provide a cost saving of approximately $8K per mission test. With an 
average of 8–10 missions per year, annual savings $64K–$110K/ year 
The schedule impacts for an average 9 missions/year would that a total of 38 days 
of setup without infrastructure. That same average 9 missions/year would net a total 
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average of approximately 19 days of setup. To put that in prospective, that 19 days setups 
savings could translate into overtime cost savings and/or more potential missions that 
could be executed. 
Although a fixed site would save valuable time and money for the customer in the 
long run, acquiring the funding for this effort in this fiscal environment will be 
challenging. According to the military services, a significant portion of their budgets are 
consumed by infrastructure (i.e., buildings and permanent installations) including the 
necessary cost to operate them.  
There are potential disadvantages for a permanent infrastructure, as it relates to 
flexibility. With a permanent infrastructure there would be less flexibility in selection of 
impact area locations and customers would have to select from predefined impact areas. 
C. RESULTS  
By examining both the non-permanent and the permanent infrastructures, the JAP 
team was able to further quantify the need for permanent infrastructure as well as explore 
the potential challenges and drawbacks associated with its implementation. It was 
determined by a root cause analysis that the set-up was identified as the key contributor 
for excessive labor within the complete mission set. The set-up component of the mission 
was further divided to sub-components in order to be able to determine which areas with 
the setup could be removed or improved. Through modifications to the process, the 
average time to execute a setup could potentially be reduced from 298 to 189 hours. 
Removing or modifying these key components would also reduce obstacles that could in 
turn reduce individual procedural problems inherent to each step. Additionally, a 
potential average cost savings of annual savings $64K–$110K/year, would be worthwhile 
for a group of program offices to do a cost sharing effort to support their ongoing 
programmatic efforts at WSMR Non-track Optic range. 
After reviewing the advantages and disadvantages effects of permanent 
infrastructure, we have determined that the potential advantages far exceed the benefits. 
The JAP members will examine the second major concern with the Non-track Optics 
group (i.e., networking equipment) in the next chapter. 
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V. NETWORK EQUIPMENT 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The information management directorate (IM) is organized into four divisions: 
Data Processing Division, Distributed Systems Division, Information Management 
Division and Programs/Projects Office. The IM Directorate operates and maintains the 
WSMR real-time and post-test computer systems. In addition, it provides real-time 
processing and display of both range instrumentation and telemetry data for range 
customers, as well as post-test analysis. The Distributed Systems Division uses 
distribution capabilities to support a mission to include the Inter-Range Control Center 
(IRCC), test support network, telephone and radio systems, and network 
communications. In addition, the range is equipped with hardware and software systems 
to analyze system performance and provide post test data reduction. 
IM provides services to non-track optics when the support is required. IM 
personnel run the start lines and timing lines to provide connectivity to the optics remote 
and field vans. The optics technicians then check the camera remotes and confirm that the 
timing is reliable. The technicians then run through the mission to make sure the mission 
occurs as planned.  
Network equipment is identified as a Non-track Optics issue. Network failures are 
occurring during Non-track Optics’ operations, requiring frequent repairs or correction 
and having a broad effect on entire suites of optics equipment. Based on the analysis of 
failures, as shown on Figure 27, the average time of detecting and correcting failures is 
35.6 hours. This, in turn, affects setup time, increases cost, interferes with evacuations 
and roadblocks, and decreases mission throughput. If the commo problem is solved, 
optics set-up time will cut customer costs, reducing schedule pressures that are the result 
of shifting evacuations, roadblocks, and other restrictions imposed by the range schedule. 
Reduction of these set-up times could also vastly increase mission throughput and 
reliability, resulting in higher reimbursable return, increased schedule availability and 
flexibility to the customer. 
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Figure 27.  TACLANE Trouble-Shooting Process (Current Process)  
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B. ANALYSIS 
Based on the field log books that are carried out normally during missions at 
WSMR, data was collected and was compiled in Table 12. The data indicates the type of 













P Tried to extend TSN but could not 8 
T&P 
Problem with TSN Connection at Capital Peak. DS worked on connection at 
van and the cross-connect to Pole 616 6 
P 
Problem with TACLANES, then problems streaming video. Last-minute 
decision to rush TACLANES to Wingate, then they were not used anyway 48 
P BLDG 335 could not subscribe to the video  12 
T Could not multicast of receive multicast 3 
P 
NTDIS 2 network stack failed at T-20 minutes. All video streams lost. Still 
triggered cameras through wireless Ethernet link 4 
P 
NTDIS 2 network stack failed shortly before the first impact. Network stack 
was reset after first impact. No digital camera loss, only streaming video from 
one camera 3 
T Trouble connecting to TSN. DS cleaned fibers  2 
T&P NOC needed to configure a port on the MCC stack for TCM-930 Ethernet 6 
T&P The TACLANE failed. Pulled in a tracking shelter stack 108 
T&P Problem Connecting to DS van to get on TSN 8 
T 
TACLANE problem with visor TACLANE. Sent TACLANE in to COMSEC 
for software update. No problems with this TACLANE after this. 8 
T Problem Connecting to DS van to get on TSN 6 
T&P Trouble connecting to TSN through DS van 6 
T&P No FSTE at Site. Have to extend network to working TSN at Dog Site 4 
T&P Problem connecting to DS van 12 
T 
Private Network Problems with not enough bandwidth through the E100 
TACLANEs 6 
T&P NTDIS network stack failed at T-2 minutes 2 
T 
Could not subscribe to multicast from VRF, NOC reconfigured stack and 
TACLANE to make it work. Added to router table 8 
Table 12.   Network Problems Raw Data  
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In order to conduct the analysis, the standard deviation formula (Operations 
management for competitive advantage, 2006, p. 348) was applied. 
Figure 28 indicates the mean time is 5.7895 hours for Non-track Optics to detect 
and correct network failures. This analysis was derived from network problems during 
missions that personnel experienced, such as TSN connections at certain sites and video 
not being fed to the main control building. Other problems that personnel experienced 
were the inability to connect to the communications van in the field, tactical local area 
network encryption (better known as “TACLANE”) issues, network stack issues, and 
TSN connection issues due to dirty fibers. TACLANE is a network encryption device 
developed to provide network communications security on internet protocol (IP) 
networks. Data was collected to determine the greatest network failure during Non-track 
Optics setup.  
 
Figure 28.  Summary for Detecting and Correcting Network Failures  
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From the data in Figure 29 it was determined that TACLANE issues are the 
biggest defect. For the purposes of this section, emphasis will be placed on TACLANEs. 
The current process of trouble-shooting, using the TACLANE, consists of conducting the 
mission setup and performing all checks to see if the TSN is connected correctly. If the 
TSN is not connected, then diagnostics are performed. If the diagnostics are unresolved, 
the TACLANE is taken to COMSEC for repairs or the TACLANE is replaced. 
Depending on the situation and the condition of the TACLANE, this process can take as 
long as 35.6 hours to correct. 
 
 




C. RESULTS  
The primary reason for network failure during Non-track Optics setup was the 
malfunction of TACLANE. In order to decrease the number of hours used to correct the 
problem, a potential solution is to order more TACLANEs. To determine if programs can 
share/reassign the TACLANEs, a review of existing inventory will be performed to 
determine what is needed for present and future mission requirements and offer a plan to 
budget for the purchase of TACLANEs over the next few years. 
The future state process, shown in Figure 30, will eliminate the need to send the 
failed TACLANE to COMSEC for repair, therefore reducing the overall trouble-shooting 
process.  
 
Figure 30.  TACLANE Trouble-Shooting Process (Future-State Process)  
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
According to WSMR customers, the WSMR business process did not meet the 
customer’s expectations in test planning and cost. Through this Joint Applied Project 
(JAP), we first validated the customer survey proclamations and confirmed that missions 
were exceeding cost, specifically by the Non-track Optics group during the test planning 
phase. Second, this led to one of the main objectives of this JAP, which was to examine 
the WSMR Non-track Optics support processes and look for ways to decrease costs and 
scheduling impacts in order to increase throughput. The Non-track Optics process map 
had never been adequately defined and documented in the past. Third, after conducting a 
cause and effect study for the Non-track Optics organization, it clearly identified the lack 
of permanent infrastructure and consistent network failures as the top two root causes 
impacting mission schedules and cost. Fourth, data collected from historical missions 
showed that constructing a permanent infrastructure (as opposed to a mobile 
infrastructure) would reduce cost and time associated with the set-up and teardown. Fifth, 
data collected indicated that the reason for frequent network equipment failures was due 
to unreliable TACLANEs. 
B. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED 
A summary of the lessons learned from this JAP is listed below: 
• The understanding of OR and support plan processes among MT, RO, and 
IM Directorates have been clarified. 
• There is no standardization for developing and communicating changes to 
support plans. 
• Non-track Optics process map had never been adequately defined and 
documented and hence, no performance data was readily available. 
• The Non-track Optics equipment set-up is time intensive and complex 
• The different functions of process owners have been clarified. 
• Non-track Optics requirements were not clearly defined. 
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• Resource or manpower shortfalls are growing due to decreasing indirect 
support. 
• Unexpected delays in schedule and/or higher priorities are interfering with 
project completion. 
• Reliance on complex mobile systems requires manually intensive and 
lengthy set up and tear-down. The length and complexity of set up results 
in adverse schedule pressure at WSMR.   
• Non-track Optics is perceived as being too expensive and difficult to 
schedule. This has been an ongoing concern due to the migration to digital 
technology. 
• Network failures, specifically TACLANE failures, are occurring during 
Non-track Optics operations that have broad effect on entire suites of 
equipment. These failures require an average of 5.8 hours for detection 
and correction. The customer expects no more than 1 hour for detection 
and correction. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the examination of the JAGM, GMLRS, and PAC-3 testing projects, the 
following recommendations are made: 
• Reduce Non-track Optics set-up time to cut customer cost, reduce 
schedule pressures that are the result of secondary effects of evacuations, 
roadblocks and other restrictions imposed by the range schedule. Target 
estimated cost avoidance of $70,000/year.  
• Reduce labor required for setup by at least 15%, depending on mission 
requirements. Reduction of these set up times could also significantly 
increase mission throughput, resulting in higher reimbursable return and 
increased schedule availability and flexibility to the customer. 
• Present customer with agreement plan to tailor test around new permanent 
infrastructure. This would provide improved sites with better reliability, 
security and availability. Permanent infrastructure at test site would 
include surveyed camera equipment and intact communications 
equipment, including data lines. Target goal should be an average of 
9 missions per year at each designated permanent infrastructure/site. 
Attempt to avoid site reconfiguration due to changing customer 
requirements. 
• Reduce the amount of time detecting and correcting TACLANE failures, 
which would lead to customer financial savings.  
• Procure new TACLANES to be readily available with secured network 
capabilities and be staged strategically throughout the range. This would 
require further review of existing TACLANE inventory to determine any 
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potential sharing, re-staging, etc. that could eliminate potential choke 
points in the process. The procurement of more equipment would also 
require recruiting additional trained personnel to program the TACLANES 
in the south, central and north parts of WSMR. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas were seen as open issues beyond the scope of this JAP and 
are recommended for further research: 
Permanent Infrastructure 
• Discuss with WSMR Environmental Department about archaeological 
sites and conflict with building permanent infrastructure.  
• How flexible can we be on placement should we have to work 
around a site? 
• Discuss safety aspects 
• Digging in an Impact area 
• Chances of encountering unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
• Talk to test officers about customer requirements?  
• How flexible are customers willing to be? 
• Will they accept fixed camera sites? 
• Engineering.  
• Is the scope of this project reasonable and affordable?  
• Funding 
• Are customers willing to contribute? 
• Is there Army money available? 
Network Equipment  
• Equipment Requirements  
• Are all TACLANE models considered? 
• What models will be used in the future? 
• Will more TACLANES be needed?  
• Training Requirements  
• Will this be an annual requirement? 
• Are there enough personnel trained? 
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• WSMR Staging Layout  
• Is the staging layout of this project reasonable?  
• Funding 
• Are customers willing to contribute? 
• Is there ATEC money available? 
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